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Abstract 
Attitudes towards a regional military force are of paramount importance when exploring 
public support for regional integration. Until now, however, scholarly research has not 
considered the influence of attitudes towards a regional military mechanism in the sub-
Saharan African context. Using Afrobarometer data, we demonstrate that military concerns 
are vital when exploring Tanzanian attitudes towards the proposed political federation of the 
East African Community (EAC), the East African Federation (EAF). More specifically, 
opposition to military cooperation strongly influences Tanzanian scepticism of the EAF. This 
finding is highly relevant given that referendums in the participating member states must be 
passed to facilitate political integration. Heightened opposition towards military cooperation 
raises the possibility of the public rejecting a politically integrated EAC. This poses a 
potential obstacle to the implementation of joint security policies and crucial mechanisms to 
provide a more stable region at large. We account for alternative explanations of Tanzanian 
opinion formation and reflect on the strength of military-orientated concerns for investigating 
public support for the East African project specifically and regional integration in sub-
Saharan Africa more widely. 
Keywords Tanzania, militarisation, East Africa Federation, security concerns 
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Introduction 
Attitudes towards a regional military force are of paramount importance when 
exploring public support for regional integration. In the European context (where theories of 
opinion formation have been generated), scepticism of a militarised European Union (EU) has 
created opposition to ‘further’ integration processes, calling into question the future of the EU 
project in its entirety.1 Instability and conflicts in the East African region have meant that 
security concerns are of central importance to the regional integration efforts of the dominant 
regional grouping of the area: the East African Community (EAC). Until now, however, 
scholarly research has not considered the influence of attitudes towards a regional military 
force in the East African (or wider sub-Saharan African) area. We suggest that military 
concerns are of paramount importance when exploring public support for the proposed political 
federation of the EAC, the East African Federation (EAF), and that these concerns are highly 
politically relevant given that referendums in the participating states must be passed to facilitate 
such integration.2  
We focus on public opinion in Tanzania, an EAC partner state for which we have 
comprehensive data to test military-orientated interpretations of integration attitudes. Our key 
empirical finding relates to the importance of the military aspects of regional integration.  
Tanzanian scepticism of the EAF is strongly driven by opposition to military co-operation. 
This raises the possibility, in the context of any upcoming referendum, that scepticism of 
militarism will drive a No vote, analogous to the influence of the issue of military neutrality on 
Irish rejections of the Nice and Lisbon Treaty referendums and Danish rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty.3 These rejections – for a time at least – derailed the EU integration process 
and led to the generation of specific military-related protocols/opt-outs to assuage citizens' 
concerns and facilitate the successful re-running of the referendums.4 
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This article is organised as follows. Following a brief overview of the EAC's economic, 
security and political objectives, we specify our hypotheses, describe the data used to test the 
hypotheses (Afrobarometer data from Tanzania, 2008 and 2012) and report our findings.  In 
the discussion section we reflect upon the implications of our findings regarding Tanzanian 
attitudes for our understanding of the determinants of citizen support for (and opposition to) 
the EAF more generally. We underline possible referendum-related obstacles to the 
achievement of full political integration. We also reflect upon the transferability across the 
context of EU-inspired interpretations of opinion formation: in particular, military concerns are 
likely to be of relevance in African regional projects more widely because insecurity and 
conflict are problems which are rife in all of the continent’s regions.  
 
Background: the East African Community 
Regional unity in East Africa began in the early 20th century through the creation of a 
Customs Collection Centre, an East African Currency Board and Court of Appeal.5 The EAC, 
consisting of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, was established in 1967 and was arguably the most 
sophisticated regional cooperative arrangement in the less developed world at this time. 
However, in the face of national priorities, the EAC was disbanded in 1977.6  From the mid-
1980s, the aforementioned states continued cooperation efforts and subsequently re-established 
the EAC in 1999.  Similar to the European model of integration, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
envisioned a new emphasis on socio-economic integration and set the goal to establish ‘a 
Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political 
Federation’.7  In 2005, EAC countries established a Customs Union, and in 2009, all member 
states – including the newly acceded Republics of Rwanda and Burundi – signed a Common 
Market Protocol, which was endorsed in 2010 by all partner states.  
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The joint defence forces of the EAC partner states is another prominent aspect of East 
African integration. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in Defence 
Matters was signed in 1998 and revised in 2001. Under the MoU, partner states have 
successfully pursued various activities: building confidence among defence forces, developing 
and testing Standard Operating Procedures for operations in Peacekeeping, and developing 
strategies for disaster management and counter-terrorism. According to the Secretary General 
of the EAC, ‘with rising threat of international terrorism and creeping instability…the issues 
of defence and security have assumed greater importance and significance in the agenda of 
nations and, indeed, the agenda of groupings such as ours’.8 The MoU was recently replaced 
by an EAC defence protocol under which joint initiatives with regards to the region’s insecurity 
are to continue. Increasing levels of violence and insurgence in Burundi – and the mass exodus 
of refugees from the on-going leadership crisis there – highlight the necessity of tackling a 
marred regional security environment through a joint security mechanism. Regional security 
matters gained priority in the most recent Heads of State summit (2015), as chaired by 
Tanzania’s President, Jayaka Kikwete; however, the extent to which leaders will expedite the 
implementation of relevant counter measures remains to be seen.9  
The proposed launch of the East African Political Federation in January 2010 was not 
achieved and there remains a lack of clarity as to the exact framework which political federation 
might take.10 Nonetheless, there is a general consensus among partners regarding the 
mechanism through which political federation is to be achieved: public mobilisation. In the 
(Wako) Committee – established to consider how EAC integration may be fast-tracked – the 
governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania emphasise the need to facilitate citizens in 
learning about, and being engaged in, the integration process; they concluded that ‘a public 
referendum in the three partner states would appear the most natural policy choice…to create 
a sustainable political federation’.11 Referendums in the East African region have 
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predominantly been used as a mechanism to legitimise nation-state powers;12 however, elite 
and civil society demand for a referendum on the issue of an EAF cannot continue to be 
overlooked.  Wider citizen involvement and support is perceived as fundamental to a regional 
integration project that is more successful than the previous (1977) failure.13 Given the 
relevance of citizen support for the legitimacy of the EAF, the prospect of a referendum on the 
matter is imminent; a referendum that will plausibly be driven in significant part by citizen 
views of the integration process.  
The re-invigorated EAC thus vastly diverges from the original Community on the basis 
of its democratic foundations. The formation and processes of the original Community were 
elite driven; private stakeholders and civil society were not involved in the process. In this 
regard, the original Community represented ‘the adoption of democracy, on formal grounds 
without any substantive translation… [which ultimately] crippled the prospects of regional 
integration’.14 Articles 127 - 129 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community (1999) departs from this model by specifying a ‘people-centred’ integration 
process with ‘an enabling environment for the private sector and civil society’.  Public attitudes 
have the potential to shape and constrain the process of East African integration through the 
use of referendums to legitimise further integration. In this sense, public perceptions (and 
support) provide the political foundations for integration in the current EAC.   
Over the last decade, there have been significant economic advances in the East African 
region.  With the exception of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which 
has grown at an average of 6.1% per year – the EAC, which grew at an average of 5.8% per 
year between 2001 and 2009, grew faster than all other economic communities.  Each EAC 
country more than doubled its own GDP in this time frame.15 Further, intra-regional trade in 
the EAC is reported to have increased by 23% between 2007 and 2011, the highest among all 
African economic blocs.16 Nonetheless, challenges remain at the domestic level: ‘the 
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integration process has been hit by numerous challenges including poor information flow, 
language barriers, immigration problems and cross-border crime’.17 EAC partner states have 
agreed to the removal of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) but rules and regulations have not been 
fully eliminated, posing a hindrance to intra-regional trade levels. Positively, National 
Monitoring Committees (NMCs) have been set up in all EAC partner states to address NTBs. 
Further, a Customs Management Act has been established (in 2004) and subsequently revised 
(2011) to harmonise customs validation procedures in partner states.18 
The leaders of EAC partner states have not tended to act harmoniously in relation to 
joint policy initiatives, as demonstrated prominently by elite responses to regional insecurity.  
All partner states are not part of the same AU derived Standby Force: Tanzania is committed 
to the Southern African Standby Force through its membership in the South African 
Development Community (SADC); Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are committed to 
the East African Standby Force and thus a different security and defence mechanism.  When 
Tanzania recently intervened in the Democratic Republic of Congo through SADC obligation, 
it went against EAC security and defence protocol, which stipulates that on matters of security 
and defence, member states should act together.19 Tanzania’s collaboration with countries in 
the southern African region – in terms of security and trade – does not necessarily imply 
preference for that region overall, merely that the Tanzanian elite are utilising advantageous 
ties with such countries that are in near proximity. Nonetheless, the presidents of Kenya, 
Uganda and Rwanda have advanced their own initiatives in what is now known as the ‘coalition 
of the willing’. Insofar as regional integration is concerned, these latter countries have pursued 
joint tourist visa arrangements, infrastructure projects and security initiatives without the 
involvement of Tanzania and Burundi in the process.   
Leadership in Tanzania and Burundi over the next few years is likely to play a divisive 
role in the future speed and direction of the EAC. Burundi’s President Nkurunziza has 
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distanced himself from the help and assistance of his East African counterparts (and 
international donors, upon which the Burundian economy is dependent) through his decision 
to stand for re-election for a third term - and win the election despite lacking democratic 
credentials.  During his leadership years, Tanzania’s President Kikwete demonstrated renewed 
Tanzanian commitment to EAC measures through his position as EAC chairperson and face-
to-face meetings with Kenya’s President Kenyatta.  However, with a new Tanzanian president 
in place since October 2015 elections (CCM’s John Magufili), national constitutional issues 
are likely to take priority – issues which President Kikwete failed to resolve – above regional 
integration efforts. Thus, with indefinite Tanzanian commitments to the EAC in the long-term 
(and the implementation of economic, security and political initiatives alike), a furtherance of 
the ‘coalition of the willing’ is debateable.20 
In sharp contrast to elite narratives on EAC progression, this paper is concerned with 
citizen standpoints on greater integration in the region. Both local and international elite 
influences are certainly integral to the development of the EAC, but lacking citizen support 
could pose an obstacle for policy makers to deliver any such direction, hence key interest in 
citizen attitude formation on the matter. A recent survey suggests that 85% of Tanzanians 
approve (or strongly approve) of greater integration with Kenya and Uganda, while 62% further 
support integration measures with Burundi and Rwanda.21 Our aim is to find out if the idea of 
a militarised EAC explains Tanzanian support for - or scepticism of - political integration in 
East Africa. We further aim to discuss the real world important implications of our findings for 
a referendum, which would either legitimise or prohibit further integration in the region.  
Hypotheses: explaining support (and opposition) for East African Federation 
Using EU-based literature on opinion formation as our departure point, we outline our 
key expectation relating to the role of attitudes towards a joint military force in explaining 
support for the political federation of East Africa. The EAC policy domain encompasses 
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economic, security, social and political objectives at its core, therefore it is also useful to 
generate alternative explanations of opinion formation: we specify factors that have been 
crucial in a developed (EU) context (economics, identity and cognitive mobilisation), and an 
additional factor which we derive from the East African integration case: perceptions of 
previous integration failures.  
Security-related determinants  
Opposition to military co-operation has been a source of scepticism in EU member 
states: without the generation of official protocols and clarifications to overcome antipathy to 
a militaristic EU, the continuation of European integration would have been subject to question. 
For Danish opponents of the Maastricht Treaty, ‘Denmark’s smallness meant that it could not 
bring Europe up…European aspirations for a common defence and foreign policy were read 
by many as the first signs of post-Cold War great power politics which might ultimately involve 
Danes in militaristic adventurism’.22 Danes approved the treaty in 1993 after defence and 
foreign policy elements were altered. More recently, in the Irish EU referendum context (with 
regards to the initial rejection of the Nice and Lisbon treaties), concerns over potential loss of 
military neutrality influenced vote choice. After both initial rejections, protocols and 
clarifications were needed to unambiguously state Ireland's non-commitment to an EU 
common defence, to neutralise the military issue, and to facilitate citizens' subsequent approval 
of the treaty in a second referendum.23 Similarly, in a non-EU context (North-East Asia), 
scholars have highlighted the role of security related factors. In two separate analyses of South 
Korean support for North East Asian integration, perceptions of threat from neighbouring 
countries (China, Japan and North Korea) were found to be paramount.24 
We expect that opposition towards a regional security and defence framework will 
similarly have paramount importance in the East African context. The prevalence of conflict, 
terrorist and rebel group action and citizen dislocation in East Africa indicates that matters of 
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security are likely to be at the forefront of voter minds.  Regional integration is perceived as a 
vital method to overcome instability and provide a peaceful environment. In this regard, if a 
citizen is in favour of a regional response to security problems, i.e. the formation of a joint 
army, they are likely to support the further integration of the EAC partner states. Conversely, 
if a citizen perceives a more militarised region as a response that will draw their principality 
into neighbouring – currently, Burundian - conflict, they are unlikely to support regional 
integration initiatives and the security-orientated commitments involved. Notably, we do not 
infer that a majority of citizens oppose or support a more militarised region overall; we present 
the rationale that those who are more supportive - relative to those who are more opposed - of 
a militarised East African region are likely to perceive the EAF more positively. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Citizens who approve a joint military force in East Africa 
support East African political integration. 25 
Alternative explanations 
We draw on three additional theories of opinion formation, which have gained 
prominence in the EU context and which will plausibly account for any further variation in 
individual-level support for the EAF. Aligned to the economic endeavour of most European 
integration efforts, the first indicates the importance of economic determinants in explaining 
public support. Gabel and Palmer suggest that European integration differentially affects 
citizens depending on their level of 'human capital'.26 Citizens with high levels of human capital 
– who are highly educated and skilled – are equipped to compete successfully in an expanded 
market with heightened investment opportunities. They are well placed to avail of the market 
opportunities that follow from the integration process and are able to adapt to economic 
adjustments that occur. In contrast, those with relatively low levels of education and skills are 
likely to be less capable of taking advantage of such opportunities and are thus more likely to 
be threatened by, and be vulnerable to, increased competition. In East Africa, over the past two 
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decades there has been a decline in the dominance of traditional/subsistence agriculture and a 
rise in skills-based industries and service sectors,27 leading to the generation of considerable 
variation in the levels of human capital that citizens have.28 While there remains a vast 
difference between Europe and East Africa in terms of occupational structure – and human 
capital levels are, overall, much lower in East Africa than in the EU – we expect that egocentric 
economic reasoning has similar implications for understanding attitudes to regional integration 
in both contexts:    
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Citizens in East Africa with high human capital levels support 
East African political integration. 
 The processes of economic and political integration are closely aligned in the EAC 
context and the relationship between the two may usefully be viewed either as 'linear' or 
'concurrent'. 'Linear' models of integration (including, according to Mattli, the EU and the 
EAC) are characterised by a step-wise process: political unification – the ultimate end goal – 
follows on from economic integration (for example, free movement of labour, a common 
market, customs union and monetary union).29 As a result of the economic and political failure 
of the ‘old’ EAC, the objective of political integration in the current EAC framework is very 
closely linked to economic integration.30 The inter-governmental Wako Committee (referred 
to earlier) has advised an ‘overlapping’ approach whereby parallel activities of economic stages 
of integration should be merged to achieve political federation within a shorter period, and it 
was argued that ‘the establishment of the Political Federation should not wait for all 
expectations of the EAC integration to be realised’.31  Thus, if citizens do not support economic 
integration, it is unlikely that they will support further (political) integration. Conversely, if 
economic integration is supported, this is likely to spill over, making citizens much more 
amenable to further integration.  
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): Citizens who approve of economic integration in East Africa 
support East African political federation 
A second alternative explanation relates to the role of identity. As the EU has 
increasingly impacted upon the everyday lives of its citizens in the non-economic as well as 
the economic realm – particularly since the Maastricht Treaty – researchers have begun to focus 
on identity-based explanations of support for (and lack of support for) integration: ‘not only 
does European integration create economic losers and winners; it provokes a sharp sense of 
identity loss among defenders of the nation and among anti-cosmopolitans’.32 Scholars have 
specifically drawn on the psychology of group loyalty to consider how national identity 
influences scepticism of regional integration processes.33 A complex relationship has been 
found: a sense of national identity may either reinforce or undermine support for regional 
integration. 
 In order to understand this conditionality, some scholars have focused on how national 
identity relative to other identities influences attitudes to supra-national authority. For example, 
Hooghe and Marks have distinguished people with an ‘exclusive’ national identity from those 
with an ‘inclusive’ national identity, since the latter do not perceive of themselves in terms of 
one single territorial identity and therefore are more likely to be favourable towards Europe: 
‘Country first, but Europe too’.34 Other scholars have focused on the comparison between 
national and sub-national identity and how this comparison shapes views on regional 
integration. For example, stronger EU support has been found in peripheral UK regions (Wales 
and Scotland) since the EU is perceived as a means to assert regional identity distinctiveness, 
particularly when the relationship between the region and nation is perceived as troublesome.35 
 Given the importance of sub-national groups in Eastern African – notably tribal/ethnic 
groups – we focus on the ‘national’ versus ‘sub-national’/‘tribal’ identity distinction.36 The 
distinction is particularly pertinent in Tanzania as it is the only member state to have followed 
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a strong nation-building programme since independence. Arguably, the country’s socialist 
leader, Julius Nyerere, played a vital role in this process: he ‘forcefully downplayed the role of 
ethnic affiliation in public life and instead emphasised a single Tanzanian national identity’.37 
We expect that Tanzanians with a strong sense of national identity – relative to tribal identity 
– are likely to be sceptical of the EAF since an addition of this supranational layer constitutes 
a dilution of national sovereignty.38 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Citizens with a strong sense of national identity, relative to a 
sub-national tribal/ethnic identity, are sceptical of East African political integration. 
Finally, the extent that an individual is aware or knowledgeable about regional 
integration has had implications for public support in the European context and is likely to be 
of similar importance in the East African setting. Inglehart used the term ‘cognitive 
mobilisation’ to describe the skills necessary to cope with a distant political community (such 
as the European Community) and argued that those with higher levels of cognitive mobilisation 
are more likely to absorb information and be familiar with the advantages of regional 
integration than those with lower cognitive mobilisation levels.39  Janssen and Gabel 
established thereafter that those more familiar with the topic of European integration were 
generally less threatened.40 In the East African context, concern has been voiced that levels of 
knowledge and awareness of the EAC are low. For example, an investigation of citizen 
engagement with the integration process concluded that:  
… there remains the fundamental question about how East African 
citizens can broadly be involved and allowed the space to participate in 
the EAC integration process…this question has been heightened by 
what is often described as the lack of knowledge about the EAC 
amongst the broad masses…this question clearly begs another: whose 
responsibility is it to educate the citizens?41   
 
Consistent with this concern, Katera notes that a majority of Tanzanians have negligible 
knowledge of the EAC: nearly 31% had not heard anything about the Federation; 46% had 
heard ‘a little’ or ‘some’; only 20% had heard ‘a lot’.42 Debates relating to future referendums 
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on political integration in member states frequently highlight the potentially limiting impact of 
such low awareness levels.43   
 Following scholars of European public opinion, we expect that there will be significant 
differences between the many citizens with low knowledge of the EAC and the minority of 
citizens with relatively high knowledge. Those who are at least somewhat familiar with the 
EAC are more likely to absorb information on the topic and understand how regional 
integration can benefit domestic social and political circumstances. In contrast, the cognitively 
'unmobilised', who are not engaged with EAC initiatives and future prospects, are less likely to 
comprehend the meaning of community membership and are hence likely to be fearful of, and 
unsupportive of, the integration process. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Citizens in East Africa with high levels of cognitive 
mobilisation support East African political integration. 
 
Data and modelling approach 
Data from the Abrobarometer survey is used to operationalise and test the specified 
hypotheses. The Afrobarometer is an independent research project that measures public 
opinion towards the social, political and economic phenomena in 35 African countries on a 
repeated basis.44 National probability samples are used by Afrobarometer to generate samples 
that are a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in each country. 
 Survey items relating to the EAC are available for three countries (Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda) in Round 4 (2008) and one country only (Tanzania) in Round 5 (2012). Survey 
rounds prior to 2008 do not include questions that ask respondents about the EAC. We focus 
on Tanzania (2008 and 2012) since it is the only country for which it is possible to 
operationalise a survey question relating to citizen preferences regarding regional defence and 
security. 
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Dependent variable 
The following survey question is used to measure support of an EAF:  
‘People have different ideas about how much integration of the economies and political systems 
of the East African states is the right amount. Some don’t want any integration. Others support 
complete unification of the governments. Please tell me if you approve or disapprove of … the 
formation of a unitary government, including having one East African parliament and 
president.’ 
Response categories (for both time points) are on a four-point scale from: (1) strongly 
disapprove (2) disapprove (3) approve (4) strongly approve (don’t know responses/missing 
data are not included). The variables were recalibrated such that they run from a minimum of 
0 to a maximum of 1.  
Key explanatory variable 
To measure Tanzanian support for our variable of key interest - attitudes to joint East African 
defence and security mechanisms – we identify the question: ‘Please tell me if you approve or 
disapprove of each of the following aspects of the proposed integration project, or haven’t you 
heard enough to say?’ Respondents are specifically asked if they ‘approve or disapprove of the 
formation of a joint army?’ Response options are as identified above: (1) strongly disapprove 
(2) disapprove (3) agree (4) strongly agree (don’t know/missing data are not included). The 
variable was recoded to run from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1. 
‘Alternative’ explanatory variables 
To measure a respondent’s attitude towards economic integration, the aforementioned 
question is also used, but the following parts of the question are operationalised: ‘Please tell 
me if you approve or disapprove of each of the following aspects of the proposed integration 
project, or haven’t you heard enough to say? 
‘Free movement of people, goods and services’ 
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‘Customs Union, that is, creation of a uniform regime of tax and rates’  
‘Monetary Union, that is, creation of a single East African currency’’ 
Response options are: (1) strongly disapprove (2) disapprove (3) agree (4) strongly agree. 
A single scale was generated from these three variables, representing attitudes to economic 
integration, and the scale was calibrated to run from 0 to 1 (higher score relates to stronger 
support).45 
The item tapping a respondent’s level of education is used to measure human capital. 
The exact question wording is:  
‘What is the highest level of education you have completed?’ 
Response Options: (0) No formal schooling (1) Informal schooling only (2) Some primary 
schooling (3) Primary schooling completed (4) Some secondary school (5) Secondary school 
completed (6) Post-secondary qualifications, other than university, e.g. diploma or degree from 
a polytechnic or college (7) Some University (8) University Completed (9) Post-graduate 
(don’t know/missing data are not included). The variable was recoded to run from a minimum 
of 0 to a maximum of 1. 
The item tapping a respondent’s level of cognitive mobilisation is worded: 
‘How much have you heard about the proposed federation of the East African States, that is, 
the formation of unitary government for Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, with 
a joint army, parliament, presidency and economy? 
Response Options: (1) Nothing (2) Small Amount (3) Some (4) A great deal (don’t 
know/missing data are not included). The variable was recoded to run from a minimum of 0 to 
a maximum of 1. 
The following question is used to measure (comparative national versus sub-national) 
identity: 
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‘Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Tanzanian and being a [insert 
respondent’s tribal/ethnic group].  Which of the following statements best expresses your 
feelings? Response options: (1) I feel only (insert R's ethnic identity) (2) I feel more (insert R's 
ethnic identity) (3) I feel equally (insert R's ethnic identity) and Tanzanian (4) I feel more 
Tanzanian (5) I feel only Tanzanian (don’t know/missing data are not included).46 The variable 
was recoded to run from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1. 
To measure whether a respondent entered adulthood and had their formative political 
experiences in the aftermath of the failure of the first EAC but prior to the generation of the 
new EAC, respondents were coded (1) if they were in adulthood during the dis-integration 
years (ages 34+), and coded (0) if their adulthood has only involved regional integration 
experience under the new framework (ages 18-33). (Demographic controls are also included in 
the analysis: males were coded 1 and females were coded 0. Respondents from a rural 
background were coded 1 and respondents from an urban background 0.) 
Modelling approach 
We conduct a number of regression models to test our hypotheses.  Our dependent 
variable (attitudes to political unification) is a semi-continuous scale variable, therefore 
Ordinary Least Squares regression is appropriate. The variables used to explain support for 
EAF may be distinguished in terms of the extent to which they may be endogenous to the 
dependent variable. The variable used to test our key hypothesis, ‘attitudes towards a joint 
army’ is from a battery of questions which explicitly mentions the EAC, therefore, it is likely 
to be somewhat exogenous to the dependent variable relative to the (more endogenous) variable 
that we use to test for our ‘alternative’ explanations of public support. In order to test for the 
full predictive strength of these latter factors, we first run, at each time point, models with only 
the relatively exogenous variables (identity, age and education) before including the more 
endogenous economic variable (which also mentions the EAC in the question wording). 
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Finally, the variable of crucial interest – attitudes towards a joint army – is entered into a full 
model with all explanatory variables.47  
 
Results 
In the full models containing all predictor variables at both time points (model 3 and 
model 6) the results concerning our hypothesis of crucial interest are stark. The military factor 
is by far the strongest predictor of integration attitudes in both 2008 and 2012. The economic 
integration variable is also a significant predictor at both time points, but of much less 
substantive importance than the military predictor. 
- Table 1 about here - 
Due to the dominance of the military variable in our full model, we inspect a model 
containing all variables apart from the military variable. The results show a consistently strong 
role for the economic integration variable (model 2 and model 5). This suggest that attitudes 
towards economic integration and attitudes towards military integration are both related to full 
political integration and are also related to each other, but when a full regression model isolates 
the unique impact of each (i.e. model 3 and 6), it emerges that it is attitudes towards military 
integration which is by far the strongest predictor.48     
The results for our ‘alternative’ explanations of public support are mixed in the full and 
partial models. At both time points, across all models, education does not emerge as significant. 
There are inconsistencies regarding age (which is significant in 2012 but not 2008), identity 
(which is significant in 2008 but not 2012), and cognitive mobilisation (which is significant in 
2012 but not 2008). 
Discussion 
Opinion formation: value of military-orientated concerns 
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The EAC provides a particularly useful case to test (EU-generated) military related 
determinants of citizen attitudes since in contrast to many regional communities across the 
globe, which are explicitly based on economic criteria, the EAC considers joint defence and 
security as crucial to integration progression. Indeed, providing a peaceful and stable 
environment in the East African region is perceived as crucial to achieving the economic 
(Customs Union, Common Market, Monetary Union) and political objectives of the EAC. 
There are various international and internal pressures to legitimise the EAC process and involve 
citizens in an effective way. This analysis of citizen attitude formation provides an evidence-
based discussion on the legitimacy of an East African Federation that is driven in significant 
part by intentions to create a more militarised region.  
Tanzania provides a particularly interesting case study to test for military-related 
determinants of citizen support for the EAF. Tanzania is a relatively neutral country, which 
borders all of its EAC partner states. Rebel and terrorist group activities are much more 
widespread in Tanzania’s neighbouring countries, indicating why thousands of fleeing refugees 
have re-located to Tanzania over recent years. We suggest that perceptions of a joint East 
African military force are a particularly prevalent explanation of attitudes towards further 
political integration because the objective of political integration entails greater involvement 
in the unstable region at large.  
It appears from our results that support for an East African joint army has a striking 
effect on Tanzanian attitudes. Parallel to the importance of military concerns in driving 
attitudes in Ireland and Denmark, support of a joint army is a significant factor in driving 
Tanzanian attitudes towards further (political) integration.  This finding suggests that 
Tanzanians perceive political integration as a phenomenon that essentially needs to be 
underpinned by military capabilities. Support of a joint military and defence force implies 
support for political integration; scepticism of such joint capabilities (and perhaps relative 
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support of Tanzanian's military contributions elsewhere, for example, in SADC) implies 
scepticism of the EAF. In the eyes of Tanzanians, at least, EAF is thus perceived in significant 
part as a security network. A comparison of the influence of attitudes towards a joint army on 
EAC attitudes in all partner states would reveal if this relationship is indeed unique to 
Tanzania’s neutral outlook, or prevalent in all countries, therefore suggesting the underpinning 
military characteristics of EAC political integration more broadly. 
Opinion formation: value of ‘alternative’ explanations 
It emerges from our analysis that alternative (EU-generated) explanations of public 
opinion also have strength (albeit limited) in the East African region. In a similar vein to 
citizens in Europe, Tanzanians evaluate political integration with respect to key aspects of 
economic integration. The framing of economic and political integration in East Africa as 
‘overlapping’ and ‘complementary’ seems to have an effect on how citizens envision 
integration overall.49 Nonetheless, the effect of the economic factor is dwarfed by the effect of 
military concerns. Further, the findings for identity and cognitive mobilisation are mixed and 
no significant relationship emerges between educational qualifications and support for the 
EAF, suggesting that the economic consequences of regional integration in East Africa are yet 
to filter down and be ‘felt’ by ordinary African citizens. 
In addition to testing EU generated opinion formation theories, the results of this paper 
demonstrate that exploring expectations unique to the East African region are revealing.  Prior 
(failed) attempts towards regional integration in East Africa and resulting animosity and 
tension between partner states are of importance to Tanzanian opinion formation towards the 
current EAC. Having entered adulthood during the period of the first EAC collapse prompts 
scepticism of future political integration in Tanzania (2012). Entering adulthood during current 
EAC efforts has a relatively positive influence on Tanzanian attitudes. That the relationship is 
not present for the 2008 Tanzania data is puzzling; nonetheless, that Tanzanian attitudes are 
20 
 
influenced at least to some extent by this ‘experience’ factor implies the importance of 
generating determinants specific to a given context.  
A further unique aspect of regional integration in East Africa – and across the continent 
more generally – concerns the commitment of nation-states towards multiple regional 
integration initiatives.  In East Africa alone, there are five main regional groupings, including 
the EAC, SADC, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), IGAD 
(International Authority on Development) and ECCAS (Economic Community of Central 
African States), which overlap each other, arguably hindering liberal economic development.50 
Since the EAC is the most ambitious regional integration project, with referendums on the 
agenda to achieve full political integration, it has been of primary importance in this paper to 
explain the determinants of attitudes towards it. However, that member states have 
commitments to other regional integration arrangements potentially has a direct effect on 
support for – or scepticism of – the EAC. For example, Tanzanian support for the stated military 
objectives of SADC will plausibly underlie scepticism of parallel integration measures in the 
EAC, particularly if the conflict in Burundi escalates further. Citizens located in closer 
proximity to the southern border of Tanzania will arguably display such SADC preference to 
a greater extent.  Our analysis does not have data to test for the relative preference for one 
integration project over another, but future research on the determinants of attitudes towards 
regional integration in Africa should account for such multiple memberships. 
 
Implications of findings for referendums on East African Federation 
This analysis provides an evidence-based discussion regarding the legitimacy of an 
EAF by outlining the underling motivations of citizen support. Attitudes towards a joint East 
African army are likely to play a particularly important role in determining vote behaviour in 
EAC integration referendums, in Tanzania at least. The manner in which they do so will 
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plausibly depend upon the details of the treaty or agreement that is put to the people.51  If, for 
example, strong military co-operation is detailed, the salience of security issues will be raised, 
potentially leading to significant Tanzanian opposition to the treaty/agreement.  In this 
scenario, a ‘two-speed’ East African integration process is plausible, in which Tanzania and 
Burundi are left behind as the ‘coalition of the willing’ accelerates further. The EAC elite might 
find it necessary to issue specific protocols or military opt-outs to assuage the Tanzanian (and 
perhaps wider) public on the issue of a joint military force. If the East African elite fail to 
provide a referendum in the short-term, this analysis highlights the reality that EAF legitimacy 
can be withdrawn on the basis of underlying military concerns, potentially inhibiting the long-
term success of the integration project overall. 
An additional factor to consider includes the role of second-order national elections.  
East African referendums could arguably be used as a vehicle for expressing citizen satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with the domestic government and thus referendums will not approximate 
high quality deliberative events.52 In the EU context, voter emotions have been demonstrated 
to substantively influence vote choice: relative to anxious voters, angry voters rely more on 
second-order issues (domestic politics) when evaluating the EU. 53  If emotions of fear and 
anxiety are high among an East African electorate – a likely impact of instability in the region 
– citizen engagement with the specific implications of the EAC will arguably be prevalent. In 
this instance, campaigning from the EAC elite will be divisive in driving vote choice. On the 
contrary, if voters are politically dissatisfied and angered by widespread instability, protest 
votes directed at national administrations may be more credible.  Further research on this topic 
in the East African context would be revealing.  
Conclusion 
22 
 
Military concerns are integral to an investigation of support for regional integration 
initiatives. This analysis demonstrates that a citizen’s attitude with regards a joint military force 
has paramount explanatory value in a very different developing context (the EAC) relative to 
the developed context (the EU) in which this theoretical interpretation was first generated.  This 
central finding has specific implications for the future of integration in the East African region. 
Peace and security concerns are at the forefront of EAC discussions - the EAC elite will need 
to assuage citizens with military concerns if the EAF is to be a legitimate and truly ‘people-
driven’ project. Further, it prompts the exploration of regional integration attitudes elsewhere 
in Africa (and the world) through EU-generated opinion formation interpretations.  
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Table 1: Predicting support for East African Federation (OLS Regression)      
 Tanzania 2008  Tanzania 2012  
 1 2 3  4 5 6  
         
Rural -.037 (.026) -.028 (.025) -.009 (.018)  .061*** (.016) .055*** (.015) .014** (.013)  
         
Male -.045 (.023) -.019 (.023) .003 (.017)  -.039* (.015) .000 (.015) .005 (.013)  
         
Older .022 (.023) .017 (.022) .026 (.016)  -.047** (.016) -.038 (.015) -.027* (.013)  
         
Highly educated .017 (.089) .028 (.087) .024 (.064)  -.031 (.054) -.086 (.052) -.033 (.045)  
         
Strong national identity -.149** (.044) -.144** (.042) -.048 (.031)  -.047 (.029) -.031 (.028) .015 (.024)  
         
High EAC awareness  -.015 (.033) -.032 (.024)   .127*** (.029) .063* (.025)  
         
Approve Economic Integration  .396*** (.039) .081** (.031)   .394*** (.027) .104*** (.026)  
         
Approve Joint Army   .685*** (.025)    .512*** (.019)  
         
Constant .447*** (.06) .173** (.063) .047 (.047)  .425*** (.037) .126** (.039) .049 (.034)  
Adj. R2: .016 .115 .525  .012 .125 .343  
N: 895 895 895  2104 2104 2104  
         
Note: Afrobarometer data, available at: http://afrobarometer.org/.  Figures are unstandardised co-efficients with standard errors in 
parenthesis. The dependant and all predictor variables run from 0 to 1.  
Levels of statistical significance are *.05, **.01, ***.001.       
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